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THE NATIVE SPECIES PROTECTION ACT: A DECEPTIVELY-
NAMED MEASURE TO DESTROY THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
DANIEL FORS†
Nothing is more priceless and more worthy of preserva-
tion than the rich array of animal life with which our
country has been blessed. It is a many-faceted treasure, of
value to scholars, scientists, and nature lovers alike, and it
forms a vital part of the heritage we all share as Americans.
– Richard Nixon1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is historically known as the
“pit bull” of environmental laws because as longtime conservationist
Don Barry once put it: “[i]t’s short, compact and has a hell of a set
of teeth.”2  The ESA also deserves that moniker for its ability to de-
fend an onslaught of direct attacks.3  According to the Center for
Biological Diversity, the ESA has withstood 303 legislative attacks
since 1996.4  These attacks have increased in recent years, with 164
legislative attacks occurring in the past five years.5
One of the more recent attacks on the ESA occurred on Sep-
tember 26, 2017, when United States Senators Mike Lee, Orrin
Hatch, and David Vitter introduced Senate Bill 1863: the Native
† J.D., 2018, Florida International University College of Law; B.S., 2015, Flor-
ida International University.  The author wishes to thank Professor Kalyani Rob-
bins for her encouragement and guidance, as well as the Managing Editors Kristen
Harvilla and Nicole Haiem for their hard work and invaluable assistance through-
out the editing process.
1. Richard M. Nixon, Statement on Signing the Endangered Species Act of
1973, 10 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Docs. 1 (Dec. 28, 1973) (signing Endangered Species
Act into law).
2. Timothy Egan, Strongest U.S. Environment Law May Become Endangered Species,
N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/26/us/strongest-
us-environment-law-may-become-endangered-species.html?pagewanted=all
(describing Endangered Species Act’s legal force).
3. Attacks on the Endangered Species Act, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://
www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/esa_attacks/table.html (last updated Dec.
2017) (tracking and updating legislative attacks on ESA).
4. Politics of Extinction: A Comprehensive Report, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
(July 2015), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/esa_attacks/pdfs/
Politics_of_Extinction.pdf (examining legislative and congressional records over
past twenty years to track legislative attacks on ESA).
5. Id. (tracking recent attacks on ESA).
(177)
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Species Protection Act (Act).6  The Act aims to immensely reduce
the ESA’s effectiveness by abolishing the ESA’s authority to regulate
“intrastate” species.7  The Act is among the first of what is likely to
be many attempts to effectively gut the ESA under the current ad-
ministration.8  Although a movement to overhaul the ESA has been
brewing for some time, the threat seems realer today given the shift
in tone and approach between administrations.9
The Native Species Protection Act is not a viable reform be-
cause it would severely undermine the ESA’s ability to protect both
intrastate and interstate endangered species.  The states are ill-
equipped, both financially and politically, to appropriately regulate
intrastate species.10  The Native Species Protection Act is motivated
by interests unrelated to protecting biodiversity, and to remove in-
trastate species from the ESA’s jurisdiction would effectively gut the
federal act.11
The ESA is far from perfect, but the Native Species Protection
Act is not the fair and balanced compromise that its proponents
advertise.12  This paper aims to evaluate the Native Species Protec-
tion Act’s potentially devastating effects on biodiversity and deter-
mine whether the states are truly capable of taking on the
responsibilities that the Native Species Protection Act would bestow
upon them.  Part I provides background information on the Native
Species Protection Act and the ESA’s present authority to regulate
6. Native Species Protection Act, S. 1863, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing ESA
reform).
7. See Legislative Attacks on the Endangered Species Act During the Trump Adminis-
tration, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/cam
paigns/esa_attacks/trumptable.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2018) (explaining im-
pact of proposed Act).
8. See id. (tracking legislative attacks on ESA during Trump presidency).  The
Center notes that legislative attacks on the ESA have increased exponentially since
the Republican Party took control of the House of Representatives and predicts
that these bills are more likely to become law under the current administration.
Id.
9. Jeff Richards, Utah Prairie Dog in Both Legislative and Legal Crosshairs, ST.
GEORGE NEWS (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.stgeorgeutah.com/news/archive/
2017/09/28/jmr-utah-prairie-dog-in-both-legislative-and-legal-crosshairs (noting
that ESA opponents have been emboldened by prospect of more sympathetic ad-
ministration).  U.S. Senator Mike Lee’s communication director recently told the
media “[w]e believe that with a different president there is a much better chance
the legislation can advance.” Id.
10. For further discussion on states’ capacity to manage endangered species,
see infra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion on the purpose of the Native Species Protection
Act and its potential impact on ESA, see infra notes 91-107 and accompanying text.
12. See U.S. Senator Mike Lee, The Native Species Protection Act, ISSUE IN FOCUS
(Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/9/the-na
tive-species-protection-act (calling Native Species Act common-sense reform).
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intrastate species under the Commerce Clause.13  Part II examines
the states’ current capacities to become solely responsible for intra-
state species protection and argues that the Native Species Protec-
tion Act would effectively gut the ESA.14  Part III offers ideas
supporting a potential compromise between the states and federal
agencies going forward.15
II. LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE ESA’S AUTHORITY
TO REGULATE INTRASTATE SPECIES: THE LATEST ATTEMPTS TO
REFORM THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
A. The Native Species Protection Act
At 133 words, the proposed Native Species Protection Act is
not a long or complex bill.16  However, the Act’s brevity does not
accurately reflect its reach and potential impact.17  The Act con-
tains two clauses that would completely transform current biodivers-
ity law.18  First, the Act defines the term “intrastate species” as “any
species of plant or fish or wildlife (as those terms are defined in
section 3 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973) that is: (1) found
entirely within the borders of a single State; and (2) not part of a
national market for any commodity.”19  The Act then goes on to
state that an intrastate species shall not be:
(1) considered to be in interstate commerce; and (2) sub-
ject to regulation under either (A) the Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973; or (B) any other provision of law under
which regulatory authority is based on the power of Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce as enumerated in
13. For a further discussion on background information on the Native Spe-
cies Protection Act and ESA’s authority under Commerce Clause, see infra notes
16-52 and accompanying text.
14. For an analysis of states’ ability to protect intrastate species and potential
impact on the ESA, see infra notes 107-165 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion on a potential compromise between states and federal
agencies in regards to the ESA and the Native Species Protection Act, see infra
notes 170-189 and accompanying text.
16. Native Species Protection Act, S. 1863, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing
ESA reform).
17. For further discussion on purpose of Native Species Protection Act and
potential impact on ESA, see infra notes 107-136 and accompanying text.
18. For further discussion on case law affirming the ESA’s authority to regu-
late intrastate species under the Commerce Clause, see infra notes 32-52 and ac-
companying text.
19. Native Species Protection Act, S. 1863, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing
ESA reform).
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article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution of the
United States.20
In short, the Act accomplishes two critical objectives.21  First, it
removes intrastate species from federal regulation under the ESA
and into the hands of those species’ home states.22  Second, it seeks
to abrogate legal precedent that designates intrastate species as part
of interstate commerce.23
The Act’s proponents have set forth arguments that appeal to
our country’s traditional notions of federalism.24  In his official
blog, Senator Mike Lee of Utah tells the story of Utah farmers and
their “rodent” problem.25  The Utah Prairie Dog, a listed intrastate
species under the ESA, has recovered successfully under federal
regulation.26  Lee writes, however: “[i]f you live far away in Wash-
ington, D.C., this may sound like fantastic news, but if you live in
southwest Utah, the only place in the world this species of prairie
dog exists, it is not so great.”27  As a result of its successful multipli-
cation, the Utah Prairie Dog has become a nuisance for locals.28
Lee drew his inspiration for the proposed Act from his state’s “ro-
dent” problem.29  Lee believes that “[t]he people of Cedar City
[Utah] shouldn’t have to seek permission from Washington, D.C.
to control their rodent population” and that his proposed Act is a
20. Id. (proposing ESA reform).
21. Id. (giving states exclusive authority over intrastate species and declaring
inapplicability of Commerce Clause to federal regulation of those species).
22. Id. at Section 2(a) (giving states exclusive authority to regulate intrastate
species).
23. See People for Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 852 F.3d 990, 1007 (10th Cir. 2017) (discussing comprehensive regulatory
scheme); Markle Interests, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 827 F.3d 452, 476 (5th
Cir. 2016) (upholding Fish & Wildlife Service critical-habitat designations of purely
intrastate land for a purely intrastate species under the Commerce Clause); Nat’l
Ass’n of Home Builders of the U.S. v. Babbit, 949 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996), aff’d
sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(stating species of fly was article in interstate commerce, even though species was
found only in limited areas within California, for purposes of authority of Congress
under commerce clause to regulate fly under ESA).  Specifically, the court in People
for Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners concludes “that providing for the protection of
purely intrastate species is essential to the ESA’s comprehensive regulatory
scheme.” People for Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners, 852 F.2d at 1007.
24. For arguments against federal regulation of intrastate species, see infra
notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
25. Lee, The Native Species Protection Act, supra note 12 (characterizing Utah
Prairie Dog population as rodent problem).
26. Id. (discussing increase in species population).
27. Id. (advocating for enactment of Native Species Protection Act).
28. Id. (detailing increase in species).
29. Id. (explaining origins of Act).
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“commonsense reform that would limit the damage caused by fed-
eral mismanagement of protected species, while empowering state
and local officials to pursue sensible conservation plans with their
communities.”30  The latter quote represents the main argument
for the Act.  That is, the idea that state and local governments are
better suited to manage their endangered native species because
they understand the dynamic between their species, communities,
and economy better than Washington D.C. bureaucrats.31
B. The ESA’s Authority to Regulate Intrastate Species under the
Commerce Clause
In 1990, North Carolina farmer “Robert Lee Mann shot a red
wolf” in violation of the ESA believing it posed a danger to his cat-
tle.32  Mann pled guilty to the charges and responded by suing the
Secretary of the Interior.33  Mann argued that Congress exceeded
its power under the Commerce Clause by regulating an intrastate
species on non-federal land.34  The Fourth Circuit, affirming the
district court’s judgment in favor of the government, concluded
that preserving red wolves involved economic activity under the
Commerce Clause.35  The court reasoned that red wolves contrib-
ute to national tourism because people visit North Carolina to hear
them howl at night.36  The court also noted that the regulation of
red wolf takings was closely connected to interstate market-scientific
research.37  Finally, it identified a potential connection between the
regulation and the possibility of a renewed trade in fur pelts.38
In 2003, both the D.C. and Fifth Circuits upheld the ESA’s tak-
ings provision as applied to intrastate species in the face of Com-
30. Lee, The Native Species Protection Act, supra note 12 (explaining Lee’s
stance).
31. See Senators Lee, Hatch, and Vitter Introduce Native Species Protection Act, ORR-
RIN HATCH U.S. SENATOR FOR UTAH (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.hatch.senate
.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/4/senators-lee-hatch-and-vitter-introduce-native-spe
cies-protection-act (advocating for enactment of Native Species Protection Act).
32. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 489 (4th Cir. 2000) (providing factual
history).
33. Id. (explaining procedural history).
34. Id. (ruling in favor of government).
35. Id. at 490 (analyzing ESA takings regulation under Commerce Clause).
36. Id. at 493 (tying preservation of red wolves to economic activity under
Commerce Clause).
37. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 494 (tying preservation of red wolves to economic activ-
ity under Commerce Clause).
38. Id. at 495 (tying preservation of red wolves to economic activity under
Commerce Clause).
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merce Clause challenges.39  In GDF Realty Investments Limited v.
Norton (GDF Realty),40 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the species
were commodities and held that aggregating the economic impact
of their takings resulted in the requisite “substantial effect on inter-
state commerce.”41  The D.C. Circuit reached the same conclusion
but for different reasons.42  In Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton (Rancho
Viejo),43 where a housing development project was halted due to the
presence of an endangered toad species, the court focused its Com-
merce Clause analysis on the project instead of the toads.44  The
court held that because the project was to be developed near a ma-
jor highway, it would “presumably” employ “materials and people
from outside the state[.]”45
Recently, in People for Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v.
United States Fish & Wildlife Services (PETPO),46 the Tenth Circuit
reaffirmed the ESA’s authority to regulate intrastate species under
the Commerce Clause.47  The court, applying the test developed in
Gonzales v. Raich,48 determined “that Congress had a rational basis
to believe that such a regulation constituted an essential part of the
ESA’s broader regulatory scheme which, in the aggregate, substan-
39. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(upholding regulation of intrastate toad species under Commerce Clause); GDF
Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding
regulation of intrastate invertebrate species under Commerce Clause).
40. 326 F.3d 622, 640 (5th Cir. 2003).
41. See id. at 640 (looking beyond taking of species to find economic impact).
42. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (ex-
cluding species at issue from Commerce Clause analysis).
43. 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
44. See id. at 1069 (connecting development project affecting toad species to
interstate commerce).
45. Id. (establishing requisite link to interstate commerce).
46. People for Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 852 F.3d 990 (10th Cir. 2017) (hereinafter PETPO ).
47. Id. at 1007 (ruling in favor of U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service).  The Native
Species Protection Act was inspired, at least in part, by the Tenth Circuit’s decision
in PETPO. See Lee, The Native Species Protection Act, supra note 12.
48. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); PETPO at 1007 (applying Raich test).
The Tenth Circuit summarized the test as follows:
In short, the Commerce Clause authorizes regulation of noncommercial,
purely intrastate activity that is an essential part of a broader regulatory
scheme that, as a whole, substantially affects interstate commerce (i.e.,
has a substantial relation to interstate commerce). Therefore, to uphold
the challenged regulation here, we need only conclude that Congress
had a rational basis to believe that such a regulation constituted an essen-
tial part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme that, in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce.
PETPO, 852 F.3d at 1002.
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tially affects interstate commerce.”49  Notably, the court specified
that the Raich test does not require a “comprehensive economic regu-
latory scheme,” only a “comprehensive regulatory scheme” that has
a “substantial relation to commerce.”50
The Tenth Circuit’s distinction was important because it high-
lighted the importance of intrastate species to the ESA’s conserva-
tion goals in the context of ecosystems and biodiversity.51  Instead
of manufacturing an attenuated chain that links the Utah Prairie
Dog to some interstate economic concern, the court pointed to the
“interconnectedness” of nature and held that a “piecemeal excision
of purely intrastate species would severely undercut the ESA’s con-
servation purposes . . . [or,] [p]ut another way, excising purely in-
trastate species ‘would leave a gaping hole in the’ ESA.”52  The
strongest and most rational argument for the ESA’s authority to
regulate intrastate species comes from science, not legal fiction,
and the courts should continue to keep sight of this.53
The foregoing decisions, which all reached the same conclu-
sion through unique reasoning, show that the federal circuit courts
are determined to keep intrastate species within the ESA’s reach.54
The ESA is unlikely to lose this exclusive authority through the judi-
cial branch and it is no secret why the ESA’s opponents are now
taking their fight to the Hill.55
C. The States’ Ability to Protect Endangered Intrastate Species
A recent report by the Center for Land, Environment, and Nat-
ural Resources at the University of California Irvine School of Law
concluded that, absent substantial state law reform and a significant
increase in funding, transferring responsibility for endangered spe-
cies to the states is likely to seriously undermine conservation
efforts.56
49. Id. (applying Raich test).
50. Id. at 1005-06 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005)) (empha-
sis added) (clarifying Raich test).
51. PETPO, 852 F.3d at 1007 (explaining ecological component of ESA’s regu-
latory scheme).
52. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005)) (explaining ecologi-
cal component of ESA’s regulatory scheme).
53. For a discussion on the ecological purpose of federal regulation of inter-
state and intrastate species, see infra notes 123-136 and accompanying text.
54. For a list of cases upholding ESA’s authority to regulate intrastate species,
see supra note 23.
55. See Lee, The Native Species Protection Act, supra note 12 (explaining failure in
seeking relief from courts).
56. See Alejandro E. Camacho et. al, Assessing State Laws and Resources for En-
dangered Species Protection, 47 ENVTL. LAW REPORTER 10837 (Oct. 2017), https://
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First, most states have species protection laws that are under-
inclusive.57  Thirty-two states provide less coverage than the Federal
ESA and seventeen states fail to provide any protection at all for
endangered and threatened plants.58  According to the report, this
trend in under-listing may be linked to the fact that only one-half of
states expressly require that species protection decisions be based
on rigorous science.59  In fact, thirty percent of states fail to provide
any evidentiary requirements at all.60  Many states’ endangered spe-
cies laws also lack the ESA’s critical “interagency consultation
requirement[.]”61
Authority to designate critical habitat, a paramount feature of
ESA recovery plans, is also lacking among the states.62  Thirty-eight
states fail to provide any authority for the designation of critical
habitat for listed species.63  Similarly, only Massachusetts expressly
recognizes habitat destruction as a prohibited “take” of a species.64
Most states also fail to impose restrictions on private land use.65
Only sixteen states “restrict private land use when state authoriza-
tion or funding is implicated.”66  The ESA imposes much stricter
requirements to ensure that “any action authorized, funded, or car-
ried out by [a federal] agency is not likely to jeopardize the contin-
ued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or
www.law.uci.edu/academics/centers/cleanr/images/cleanr-esa-report.pdf (study-
ing states’ capacity to manage endangered species).
57. Id. (surveying state endangered species laws).
58. Id. (noting lack of protective measures for endangered plants).
59. Id. (discussing states’ species listing criteria).
60. Id. (discussing states’ evidentiary requirements).
61. Camacho, supra note 56 (explaining states lack of interagency consulta-
tion requirements).  “This requirement ensures that any potential effects on a
listed species from an activity proposed by a government agency are analyzed and
minimized in partnership with those officials in that jurisdiction with the experi-
ence, training, and expertise in endangered species management.” Id.
62. Id. (examining habitat protection features in state endangered species
laws); see also Susan George, William J. Snape III & Michael Senatore, STATE ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES ACTS: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 348 (2010), https://www.biologi
caldiversity.org/publications/papers/StateEndangeredSpeciesActs.pdf (noting
most states lack critical habitat designation).  In fact, “[o]nly six states have provi-
sions requiring critical habitat designation and it is rarely used.” Id.
63. Camacho, supra note 56 (examining habitat protection features in state
endangered species laws).
64. George, supra note 62 (comparing state endangered species laws to Fed-
eral ESA).
65. Camacho, supra note 56 (explaining private land use).  Roughly two-thirds
of states “fail to restrict private land use that would jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of endangered or threatened species, or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species[.]” Id.
66. Camacho, supra note 56 (noting lack of jeopardy standard in state laws).
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result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such
species.”67
States also lack the financial resources, and/or are unwilling to
sufficiently expend funding, to effectively protect endangered spe-
cies.68  The University of California Irvine School of Law’s report
found that state spending to implement the ESA is negligible, con-
tributing to only five percent of total ESA expenditures.69  For ex-
ample, Hawaii—home to numerous listed animal and plant
species—only spent $234,080 on ESA implementation in 2013.70
Other states dedicated even less funds.  Fifteen states contributed
less than $100,000 to ESA implementation and eight states reported
implementation expenditures of less than $50,000.71  These states
were far behind Washington, which spent $32 million implement-
ing the ESA in 2013.72
Finally, state endangered species acts lack proper enforce-
ment.73  Notably, no state’s endangered species act contains a pri-
vate suit provision to allow citizens to force compliance with the
law.74  As one report explains, “[w]ithout the ability to enforce en-
dangered species laws, these acts have no teeth.”75  The absence of
these provisions is critical, as the majority of federal listings during
the last decade are the result of citizen suits and petitions against
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.76
67. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2)) (discussing ESA’s jeopardy
provision).
68. Id. (concluding states cannot presently take on financial burden of effec-
tive species protection).
69. Id. (noting state spending efforts are lacking).
70. Id. (noting Hawaii’s low expenditure given high number of endangered
species found in state).
71. Camacho, supra note 56 (surveying states’ expenditures in ESA
implementation).
72. Id. (surveying states’ expenditures in ESA implementation).
73. See George, supra note 62 (noting lack of significant penalties in state
laws).
74. Id. (noting state laws lack private suit provisions).
75. Id.  (explaining importance of enforcement provisions).
76. Id.  (discussing effect of private suits).
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III. THE NATIVE SPECIES PROTECTION ACT’S POTENTIALLY
DEVASTATING EFFECT ON THE ESA AND BIODIVERSITY
A. Ulterior Motives Behind the Native Species Protection Act
The Native Species Protection Act is not the first proposed leg-
islation of its kind,77 and the motive behind this reform has always
been the same: property rights and economic interests.78  The En-
dangered Species Management Self-Determination Act was first in-
troduced in 2013 and is now back on the floor for consideration.79
The Act seeks to give states exclusive authority over species con-
tained solely within their boundaries.80  The proposed bill, which
focuses on protecting property rights in the context of conserva-
tion, would even add a section titled “Property Rights” to the ESA.81
This provision would require the Secretary of the Interior to pay
landowners 150% of fair market value when the ESA imposes a det-
rimental land use restriction on their property.82  Similarly, a failed
amendment to the 2015 congressional budget—proposed by none
other than Senator Mike Lee—sought “to establish a spending-neu-
tral reserve fund related to clarifying federal jurisdiction with re-
spect to intrastate species.”83
The recently re-introduced State, Tribal, and Local Species
Transparency and Recovery Act, also seeks to undermine federal
regulation of intrastate species but in a more indirect manner.84
The proposed legislation would overthrow the ESA’s science-
backed listing procedure by allowing any information provided by
states, tribes, or counties to constitute “best available science.”85
77. See, e.g., Endangered Species Management Self-Determination Act, S. 935,
115th Cong. (2017) (proposing ESA amendment).  This amendment would “per-
mit Governors of States to regulate intrastate endangered species and intrastate
threatened species, and for other purposes.” Id.
78. For a discussion on the role of property rights in proposed ESA reforms,
see infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
79. Endangered Species Management Self-Determination Act, supra note 77
(proposing ESA reform).
80. Id. (advocating for ESA reform).
81. Id. at Section 12b (providing relief to affected property owners).
82. Id. (mandating compensation to property owners).
83. S. Amdt. 759 to S. Con. Res. 11, 114th Cong. (2015) (prohibiting federal
regulation of entirely intrastate species).
84. State, Tribal, and Local Species Transparency and Recovery Act, H.R.
1274, 115th Cong. (2018) (proposing changes to ESA listing procedure and
requirements).
85. House Committee Moves to Gut the Endangered Species Act, DEFENDERS OF WILD-
LIFE PRESS RELEASE (Sept. 12, 2017), http://newsroom.defenders.org/house-com
mittee-moves-to-gut-the-endangered-species-act (quoting State, Tribal, and Local
Species Transparency and Recovery Act, H.R. 1274, 115th Congress (2017-2018))
(discussing shortcomings of various recently proposed ESA reforms).
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The bill would also require the Federal Government to consider
non-scientific state and local data before listing a species.86  Under
the ESA, the Federal Government is already directed to collaborate
extensively with state and local governments, which suggests that
the bill’s proponents seek an even more influential role in this pro-
cess.87  Presumably, this reform would allow state and local govern-
ments to concoct non-scientific justifications to block listings that
impede their economic interests.88  At a legislative hearing in 2014,
when the State, Tribal, and Local Species Transparency and Recov-
ery Act was first introduced, the ESA’s effect on property rights was
an overarching theme.89  U.S. Senator Tom Casperson commented:
“Today’s law does not provide that balance to ensure property
rights and use are maintained and promoted where appropriate,
and that is why the committee should vote to approve [the
bill][.]”90  This may suggest that the bill’s proponents seek to use
the new “state and local data” category to introduce economic im-
pact into the listing process.
The Native Species Protection Act boasts an endearing short
title.  Its name, taken in isolation, provokes thoughts of state pride
in native species and implies a concern for those species’ longevity.
One might even assume, incorrectly but understandably, that the
Act was created in response to the ESA’s inadequate protection of
intrastate species.  In reality, the Act’s proponents are motivated—
at least in part—by the ESA’s success in protecting intrastate species
too effectively in the face of economic interests and property
rights.91  Senator Mike Lee has no qualms admitting that his bill is
86. Id. (discussing shortcomings of various recently proposed ESA reforms).
87. See, e.g., Revised Interagency Cooperative Policy Regarding the Role of State Agen-
cies in ESA Activities, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICES (Feb. 22, 2016), https://
www.fws.gov/endangered/laws-policies/revised-policy-state-agencies.html (di-
recting Secretaries of Interior and Commerce to cooperate to maximum extent
practicable with States in carrying out ESA programs).
88. House Committee Moves to Gut the Endangered Species Act, supra note 85 (sug-
gesting proposed reform would overthrow ESA’s science-based listing process).
89. H.R. 4315, “21st Century Endangered Species Transparency Act”; H.R. 4316,
“Endangered Species Recovery Transparency Act”; H.R. 4317, “State, Tribal, And Local
Species Transparency and Recovery Act”; H.R. 4318, “Endangered Species Litigation Rea-
sonableness Act” Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 113th Cong. (2014), https:/
/www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg87584/html/CHRG-113hhrg87584.htm
(discussing impact on private property).
90. Id. (originating from prepared statement of Tom Casperson, U.S. Senator
from Michigan).
91. See Lee, The Native Species Protection Act, supra note 12 (stating “[t]he Utah
prairie dog population quickly recovered and by 1984 the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service agreed to reclassify the animal from ‘endangered’ to ‘threatened.’
Unfortunately, the Federal Government also chose to leave most of the regulations
protecting the Utah prairie dog in place.”).  Lee’s rationale implies that the ESA
11
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motivated by economic interests: “In the nearly fifty years since it
was signed into law, the ESA has done more to impede economic
activity, obstruct local conservation efforts, and give federal bureau-
crats regulatory control over private property, than it has done to
protect endangered species.”92  Senator Vitter is also candid in ex-
plaining the basis for his support: “There needs to be a delicate
balance between protecting endangered species, private property
rights, and local economies, and this bill will ensure that federal
bureaucrats don’t take advantage of landowners.”93  Senator Mike
Lee’s philosophical view of conservation policy is evidenced in the
way he frames the subject matter at issue, continuously referring to
Utah Prairie Dogs as “foot-tall rodents.”94  Senator Lee’s word
choice is not scientifically inaccurate, but it is rather obvious why he
chooses to use this broader classification.95  Using the term “ro-
dents,” which society associates with disease-carrying vermin, strips
the Prairie Dogs of their uniqueness, charisma, and importance to
the ecosystem at large.96  In contrast, biodiversity specialists seek to
celebrate these features, not downplay them.97  The media has long
employed this tactic to stir controversy where uncharismatic species
and economic interests are in contest.98  When the discovery of a
small population of snail darters threatened to halt construction of
an eighty million dollar dam, one journalist wrote: “The Endan-
gered Species Act has often been ridiculed; it has lent itself to cari-
cature.  An entire dam is held up by a three-inch fish, the snail
recovery plan should have been halted once the Utah Prairie Dog was no longer
on the brink of the extinction, but not yet fully recovered. Id.
92. U.S. Senator Mike Lee Press Release, Utah Senators Introduce Native Species
Protection Act (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
2017/9/utah-senators-introduce-native-species-protection-act (expressing con-
cerns over ESA’s impact on private property).
93. Hatch, supra note 31 (expressing concerns over ESA’s impact on private
property).
94. Lee, The Native Species Protection Act, supra note 12 (describing prairie dogs
as foot-tall rodents).
95. For information on promoting societal motivation to protect uncharis-
matic species, see infra note 97 and accompanying text.
96. For a discussion on the Utah Prairie Dog’s role as keystone species, see
infra notes 129-136 and accompanying text.
97. Zoe Glas, Uninteresting, Strange, or Ugly: Protecting Non-Charismatic Species,
PURDUE EXTENSION BLOG (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.purdue.edu/fnr/exten-
sion/blog/2016/08/04/uninteresting-strange-or-ugly-protecting-non-charismatic-
species/ (discussing lack of societal excitement in preservation of less charismatic
species).
98. James Drozdowski, Saving an Endangered Act: The Case for a Biodiversity Ap-
proach to ESA Conservation Efforts, 45 CAS. W. RES. L. REV. 553, 575 (1995) (discuss-
ing media’s tendency to glorify charismatic species and vilify uncharismatic
species).
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darter, that no one cares about or had even heard of before.”99
Opponents of the ESA use these belittling descriptions to under-
mine the ESA and the species it protects.100
This paper does not intend to villainize the politicians who are
pushing the Native Species Protection Act and similar ESA reform
measures.  They are free to prioritize economic and property inter-
ests over biodiversity protection.  This paper does take issue with
the way that these reform measures are branded and presented to
the public.  The Native Species Protection Act is a prime example
of deceptive political tactics.  U.S. senators who work closely with
their home states should know better than anyone else that local
governments are under-equipped to effectively manage endan-
gered species.101  Further, the senators’ eagerness to assume re-
sponsibility for such a daunting and expensive task is suspicious.
The Act’s proponents may not truly be interested in taking on the
Federal Government’s thankless job, but rather, they want to be
able to defy the ESA when its mandates do not align with their
human interests.102  One could perceive that the Act’s true goal,
regardless of its name, is to strip endangered intrastate species of
any meaningful protection and to prioritize economic interests
over those species’ preservation.103
B. The Native Species Protection Act Would Effectively Gut the
ESA
The Act is neither a modification nor addition to the ESA.104
The Act is, effectively, a radical measure to extinguish the ESA in
one fell swoop.105  This detrimental effect may be demonstrated
99. Id. (quoting The Pacific Salmon Decision, A22, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 1992)).
100. For further discussion on these tactics, see supra notes 94-97 and accom-
panying text.
101. Letter from U.S. Senator Cory Booker et al. to Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell and Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (Nov. 30, 2017), https://
www.scribd.com/document/365959683/Final-Signed-FY18-ESA-Senate-Appropria
tions-Letter (advocating for fully funded ESA).
102. For further discussion on proponents’ interests in protecting property
rights, see supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
103. See Craig Pittman, Senators Propose Ending Endangered Species Act Protection
for Florida Panthers & Lots More, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Sept. 29, 2017), http://www.
tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2017/09/29/senators-propose-ending-endan
gered-species-act-protection-for-florida-panthers-lots-more/ (explaining Utah sena-
tors’ complaints about ESA).
104. See Lee, The Native Species Protection Act, supra note 12 (arguing Native
Species Protection Act is common sense reform).
105. See People for Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 852 F.3d 990, 1007 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting that removing intrastate species
from ESA would severely undermine act).
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with simple numbers and need not rely on speculation.106  The bot-
tom line is that the Native Species Protection Act would devolve the
ESA of its authority to regulate approximately sixty-eight percent of
presently listed species overnight.107 As the Tenth Circuit com-
mented, a “piecemeal excision of purely intrastate species would
severely undercut the ESA’s conservation purposes . . . [or,] [p]ut
another way, excising purely intrastate species ‘would leave a gap-
ing hole in the’ ESA.”108
To illustrate, consider the waterlocked state of Hawaii. The Na-
tive Species Protection Act would terminate the ESA’s authority
over 497 endangered species located in the Hawaiian Islands.109
This is a disconcerting prospect, considering that the Hawaiian Is-
lands have sadly been dubbed the “extinction capital of the
world.”110  Further, Hawaiian conservationists believe that their
state is already underfunded under the ESA, and they have com-
plained that Hawaii should do more to “raise a much bigger deal at
the federal level.”111  Hawaii’s biodiversity efforts require an all-
hands-on-deck approach and the Native Species Protection Act
aims to cut out the most powerful contributor.112
The Native Species Protection Act would not only cut already
lacking funds for the island species, but it would also preclude en-
forcement of protective measures on the species’ behalf.113  Earlier
this year, multiple conservation groups sued the Hawaii Depart-
106. See id. (explaining that majority of ESA listed species exist intrastate).
107. See id. (noting that sixty-eight percent of ESA’s listed species are intra-
state); see also Senate Bill Aims to Strip Protections from Nearly 1,100 Endangered Species:
Senators Hatch, Lee Target Imperiled Wildlife Found Only in One State, CTR. FOR BIOLOGI-
CAL DIVERSITY (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_
releases/2017/endangered-species-09-28-2017.php (noting that 1,098 of ESA’s
1,655 listed species qualify as intrastate).
108. PETPO, 852 F.3d at 1007 (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge against
ESA’s regulation of intrastate species).
109. Senate Bill Would End Protection for Nearly 500 Species in Hawaii, MAUI NOW
(Sept. 28, 2017), http://mauinow.com/2017/09/28/senate-bill-would-end-protec
tion-for-nearly-500-species-in-hawaii/ (explaining potential impact of Native Spe-
cies Protection Act on Hawaii specifically).
110. Timothy A. Schuler, Hawaii’s Species: Endangered and Underfunded, HAW.
BUSINESS MAGAZINE (Oct. 10, 2017), http://www.hawaiibusiness.com/endangered-
and-underfunded/ (reporting on Hawaii’s underfunded efforts to save endan-
gered species).
111. Id. The article, quoting Hawaiian conservationists, also argues that Ha-
waii is disadvantaged under the ESA.  That issue goes beyond the scope of this
paper, but the article is cited here solely to suggest that Hawaii’s conservation ef-
forts already face challenges despite existing federal funding and support.
112. For a discussion on disproportionate spending by states and the Federal
Government, see supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
113. For a discussion on absence of private suit provisions in state endan-
gered species laws, see supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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ment of Transportation to prevent the use of existing airport lights,
which are imperiling three endangered seabird species.114  Enforce-
ment suits such as this one, at minimum, promote awareness and
acknowledgement of threats to endangered wildlife.115  For exam-
ple, in light of that litigation, which is still pending, Hawaii’s De-
partment of Transportation says it has taken steps to operate its
facilities in ways that protect endangered seabirds.116  Enforcement
lawsuits, such as this one, will not be possible if the Native Species
Protection Act is enacted.117
In short, the “pit bull” of environmental laws would only be
useful—for funding, enforcement, or otherwise—when one of the
“surviving” 557 interstate animal or plant species is implicated.118
The ESA’s reach would be severely limited and endangered species
preservation and recovery would become primarily a state issue.
The Native Species Protection Act would also weaken the ESA’s
ability to protect interstate species.119  Under the current adminis-
tration, interstate species are unlikely to benefit from increased
funding or directed focus because of a more exclusive protected
species list.120  President Trump has already proposed major budget
cuts to environmental agencies and efforts, such as the EPA and the
Endangered Species Conservation Fund.121  To an administration
that wants small government and does not appear to value biodiver-
114. Associated Press, Suit Claims Hawaii Airport Lights Harm Imperiled Seabirds,
U.S. NEWS (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/hawaii/arti
cles/2017-08-24/firm-sues-hawaii-claims-violation-of-endangered-species-act (re-
porting on endangered seabird species and lawsuit).
115. For a discussion on the role of enforcement suits, see supra notes 74-76
and accompanying text.
116. Associated Press, supra note 114 (reporting on endangered seabird
litigation).
117. See George, supra note 62, at 351 (noting all state endangered species
acts lack legal mechanism for citizen enforcement).
118. Senate Bill Aims to Strip Protections from Nearly 1,100 Endangered Species: Sena-
tors Hatch, Lee Target Imperiled Wildlife Found Only in One State, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releas
es/2017/endangered-species-09-28-2017.php (noting 1,098 of ESA’s 1,655 listed
species qualify as intrastate).
119. For a discussion on importance of state and federal cooperation in ESA
implementation, see infra notes 123-136 and accompanying text.
120. For a discussion on current administration’s budgetary decisions related
to ESA, see infra note 121 and accompanying text.
121. Trump Slashes Funds for Endangered Species, Environmental Protection, CTR.
FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (May 23, 2017), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/
news/press_releases/2017/2018-budget-05-23-2017.php (noting that Trump ad-
ministration’s 2018 proposed budget would cut U.S. Fish and Wildlife’s budget by
8.6%, the EPA’s budget by 30%, and Endangered Species Conservation Fund by
64%).
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sity, a reduced protected species list only offers further justification
for additional budget cuts and downsizing.122
Ecosystems, where the “physical and biological parts of nature
assemble into complex, interacting wholes,” do not adhere to our
political state boundaries.123 These are dynamic biological commu-
nities and even scientists struggle to ascertain their borders.124  The
notion that interstate species and intrastate species can be easily
separated for regulatory purposes without sacrificing effectiveness is
naive at best and disingenuous at worst.125  Although the Suprem-
acy Clause could favor ESA regulation where both interstate and
intrastate species are implicated, the Native Species Protection Act’s
proposed arrangement would only create additional challenges and
delay for the ESA.126  The ESA’s purpose would be stymied where
the recovery of a listed interstate species is substantially dependent
upon, or affected by, the preservation of an intrastate species.127
Courts have consistently found that regulating intrastate species is
essential to the ESA’s comprehensive regulatory scheme because of
nature’s interconnectedness.128
For a particularly relevant example of this potential conflict,
look no further than the Utah Prairie Dog.  These “foot-tall ro-
dents” are keystone species in Southwestern Utah’s threatened
sage-steppe ecosystem.129  Over 150 wildlife species depend on the
Utah Prairie Dog as a food source and/or utilize the Prairie Dog
tunnels as habitat.130  Utah’s sagebrush-steppe ecosystem is also
122. See generally Tracy Stein, The Undoing of the Endangered Species Act, THE
HILL (Apr. 13, 2018), http://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/383038-
the-undoing-of-the-endangered-species-act (detailing current administration’s at-
tacks and budget cuts).
123. John C. Nagle et. al, LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MGMT. 325 (3d
ed. 2013) (defining biodiversity).
124. Id. at 19 n.2 (defining biodiversity).
125. For a discussion on interconnectedness of ecosystems and endangered
species, see infra notes 128-136 and accompanying text.
126. For a discussion on potential conflicts arising from parallel state and fed-
eral regulation, see infra notes 128-136 and accompanying text.
127. For a discussion on interconnectedness of ecosystems and endangered
species, see infra notes 128-136 and accompanying text.
128. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1059 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (noting that extinction of one species is detrimental to other species
and ecosystems).
129. Nathaniel L Brown, Mary M. Peacock & Mark E. Ritchie, Genetic Variation
and Population Structure in a Threatened Species, the Utah Prairie Dog Cynomys Parvidens:
The Use of Genetic Data to Inform Conservation Actions, ECOLOGY AND EVOLUTION, 426,
428 (Jan. 8, 2016), http://doi.org/10.1002/ece3.1874 (discussing Utah Prairie
Dog’s importance to ecosystem).
130. Utah Prairie Dog Cynomys Parvidens ESA Status: Threatened, WILDEARTH
GUARDIANS, http://www.wildearthguardians.org/site/PageServer?pagename=spe
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home to the Gunnison Sage-Grouse, a threatened species with des-
ignated critical habitat under the ESA.131  Under the Native Species
Protection Act, a clash between interests—to the detriment of
Utah’s biodiversity—is sure to occur.  On one side, there is the in-
terstate Gunnison Sage-Grouse, which would presumably remain
protected and valued under federal regulation.132  On the other
side, there is the intrastate Utah Prairie Dog, which would be repre-
sented by officials who regard the species as a nuisance.133  The
Black-footed Ferret, a listed species since 1967 with substantial
populations in Utah, is highly dependent on the state’s Prairie
Dogs.134  This interstate ferret species feeds almost exclusively on
prairie dogs and uses prairie dog burrows as dens to raise its
young.135  In fact, Black-footed Ferrets are so reliant on prairie dogs
for food and shelter that the species cannot survive in areas where
prairie dogs are not present.136  Accordingly, the Native Species
Protection Act would not only strip intrastate species of federal pro-
tection, but it would also undermine the ESA’s efforts to protect
any connected interstate species.
In sum, although the Native Species Protection Act does not
outright repeal the ESA, the Act would effectively eviscerate it.
Overnight, the ESA would lose guardianship of over one thousand
endangered species, and at the mercy of adversarial state govern-
cies_mammals_utah_pdog (last visited Apr. 20, 2018) (discussing behavior of Utah
Prairie Dog); see also Brown et. al, supra note 129, at 428.
131. See Gunnison Sage-Grouse Species Profile, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. (Mar.
2016), https://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/factsheets/Gunnison%20Sage-
grouse%20Threatened%20Designation%20Factsheet.pdf (profiling Gunnison
Sage-Grouse species); Western State Colorado University Thornton Biology Re-
search Program, Gunnison Sage-Grouse Conservation, https://www.western.edu/aca
demics/undergraduate/biology/gunnison-sage-grouse/gunnison-sage-grouse-con
servation (discussing Gunnison Sage-Grouse as indicator species of sagebrush
steppe-ecosystem health).
132. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical
Habitat for Gunnison Sage-Grouse, 50 C.F.R. § 17 (2014) (detailing federal protec-
tions and recommendations for species’ conservation and habitat).
133. See Lee, The Native Species Protection Act, supra note 12 (characterizing
Utah Prairie Dog as nuisance species).
134. See Black-Footed Ferret Species Profile (Oct. 2016), U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
https://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/factsheets/Black-Footed-Ferret.pdf (profil-
ing Black-footed Ferret species).
135. Id.
136. Anna D. Davidson et. al, Ecological Roles and Conservation Challenges of So-
cial, Burrowing, Herbivorous Mammals in the World’s Grasslands, THE ECOLOGICAL
SOC’Y OF AMERICA, 484 (2012) (explaining Black-footed ferrets’ reliance on prairie
dogs).
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ments, the ESA’s already-challenging endeavors would only become
more difficult.137  The “pit bull” would be relegated to its cage.
C. States Lack the Capacity to Adequately Protect Intrastate
Species
Proponents of the Native Species Protection Act argue that
states are most qualified to manage intrastate animal and plant spe-
cies.138  Assuming that this is a sincerely-held belief, and that spe-
cies protection is implicit in the terms “manage” and “regulate,” there
are several reasons why this position is misguided.  States do not
have the capacity to exclusively protect intrastate species in light of
the limited resources available to them and because economic and
political realities exist that would impede the states’ ability to do
so.139
First, as Nicholas Primo explains, a state’s political character is
likely to substantially shape its environmental policies.140  Although
this influential relationship is inherent in every kind of policy deci-
sion, that influence is critical in this context where studies have
shown that “Republicans value species significantly less than Demo-
crats and Independents.”141  Primo perhaps goes too far in assert-
ing that conservative-led states will “undoubtedly” construct
environmental policies that negatively affect endangered species,
but there may be a greater risk of such a result.142  For example,
Florida’s former Republican Governor Jeb Bush was known for gen-
erously allocating funds to Florida’s integral land conservation pro-
137. See generally Daniel M. Evans et al., Species Recovery in the United States: In-
creasing the Effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act, THE ECOLOGICAL SOC’Y OF
AMERICA 8-10 (Winter 2016), https://www.esa.org/esa/wp-content/uploads/
2016/01/Issue20.pdf (discussing challenges facing ESA implementation).
138. See Lee, Utah Senators Introduce Native Species Protection Act, supra note 92
(arguing that states better equipped than Federal Government to manage intra-
state species).
139. For further discussion on limitations of states to protect endangered spe-
cies, see infra notes 140-165 and accompanying text.
140. Nicholas Primo, Federal v. State Effectiveness: An Analysis of the Endangered
Species Act and Current Potential Attempts at Reform, PEPP. POL’Y REV., Vol. 7, Article 5
(2014), http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/ppr/vol7/iss1/5 (discussing
states’ effectiveness in species conservation).
141. Id. (citing BRIAN CZECH & PAUL R. KRAUSMAN, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT, HISTORY, CONSERVATION BIOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY (John Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 2001)) (discussing relationship between political views and conservation
values).
142. See id. (concluding that conservative governments more likely to imple-
ment detrimental environmental policies).
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gram, “Take Florida Forever.”143  On the other hand, Florida’s
current Republican governor has since reduced that funding dra-
matically.144  Still, proponents of the Native Species Protection Act
ignore the possibility that some state governments would depriori-
tize species protection.  One cannot properly determine whether
states are better equipped to protect their native species without
knowing if those states even value species protection to begin with.
Proponents and opponents of measures like the Native Species Pro-
tection Act are likely talking past each other because they have dif-
ferent perceptions of what it means to effectively “regulate”
endangered species.145
The likelihood that endangered species regulation will differ
from state to state may also give rise to a “race to the bottom” prob-
lem.146  Kevin M. Shuler succinctly illustrates this potential issue
with the following example:
To state it simply, imagine that Georgia or Alabama con-
sistently allowed development resulting in the takings of
endangered species while other states (such as Florida)
denied such development projects. The “business-
friendly” states would attract more investment and devel-
opment while states retaining their environmental regula-
tory regimes would suffer a requisite loss in investment
and economic growth. The market forces that initially
benefit certain states would encourage (and pro-business
citizens would demand) other states to follow suit.147
In Gibbs v. Babbitt, the Fourth Circuit also contemplated this
effect when analyzing whether the ESA could regulate the taking of
North Carolina’s red wolf, noting that “[s]pecies conservation may
unfortunately impose additional costs on private concerns.  States
may decide to forego or limit conservation efforts in order to lower
143. Carlton Ward, Jr., Perspective: The Path of the Panther, TAMPA BAY TIMES
(Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.tampabay.com/news/perspective/perspective-the-
path-of-the-panther/2305709 (reporting on history of Florida Panther conserva-
tion efforts).
144. Id. (discussing recent funding decrease under Republican Governor
Rick Scott).
145. For further discussion on proponents’ priorities in species protection
policy, see supra notes 77-93 and accompanying text.
146. Kevin M. Shuler, Is the Endangered Species Act Endangered in the Age of Strict
Federalism? A Florida Perspective on the Recent Commerce Clause Challenges to the ESA, 57
FLA. L. REV. 1135, 1157 (2005) (discussing potential pitfalls of state-led endan-
gered species regulation).
147. Id. (explaining “race-to-the-bottom” theory).
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these costs, and other states may be forced to follow suit in order to
compete.”148
This “pressure,” whether arising from a “race to the bottom”
problem or simply from resident property owners, may be magni-
fied when stringent species protection policies are implemented at
the state or local level.  Simply put, it is easier to be heard by—and
to influence—local policy-makers because of their proximity to con-
stituents.  For example, a state Governor is protected from criticism
when a costly, controversial critical habitat designation can be
blamed on the Federal Government.  Unfortunately, costly mea-
sures that must be taken for the greater good and do not yield im-
mediate benefits are best shepherded by the faraway Federal
Government.149  The task of effectively protecting endangered
species has proven to be too unpleasant and too vehemently op-
posed to be undertaken by easily-influenced state and local
governments.150
A certain degree of remoteness and objectivity also facilitates
stringency.  The ESA (and the species it protects) has long enjoyed
the “teeth” derived from being legally recognized as requiring ef-
forts “to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost.”151  Through this recognition, the ESA has not yet
“moved mountains” so to speak, but it has moved rivers (on behalf
of minnows, to boot).152  As a practical matter, it is unlikely that any
reasonable state government would impose such robust restrictions
on itself—especially today, with over forty years of ESA-related con-
troversies to consider.153  The option is politically unviable. Intra-
state species would most likely be protected, if at all, under a more
common and bearable brand of environmental policy, such as laws
that allow for environmental interests to be balanced against other
human needs.154  In most cases, many endangered species will not
tip the scale.  Mike Lee’s position that local officials are most quali-
148. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 501 (recognizing “race-to-the-bottom” theory).
149. See Primo, supra note 140 (concluding that Federal Government in bet-
ter position to implement species protection plans).
150. See Evans, supra note 137, at 8-10 (discussing difficulty and challenges of
implementing ESA).
151. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (emphasis
added) (interpreting Congress’ intent in enacting ESA).
152. Id. (enjoining developer from constructing multi-million-dollar dam
project).
153. Brian E. Gray, The Endangered Species Act: Reform or Refutation?, 13 HAS-
TINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 5-15 (2007) (discussing ESA’s extensive his-
tory of legal and political controversy).
154. Nagle, supra note 123, at 139 (contrasting ESA’s stringency with other
environmental statutes).
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fied to determine “sensible conservation plans with their communi-
ties” may be logically sound; however, these political and practical
conflicts suggest that an impartial, foreign referee is required to
effectively pursue unpopular but necessary conservation goals.
As discussed extensively in Section I(C) of this paper, recent
reports show that states lack the resources and/or motivation to ad-
equately protect endangered species.155  Few states have demon-
strated a serious financial commitment to biodiversity through
endangered species conservation.156  The Irvine College of Law re-
port found that “state spending to implement the ESA is negligible,
with states contributing approximately [five percent] of total ESA
expenditures.”157  Furthermore, a large portion of these “state” ex-
penditures actually derive from federal funding, not independent
state sources.158
The state of Hawaii, which under the Native Species Protection
Act would be solely responsible for the protection of 497 endan-
gered species,159 dedicated merely $234,080 to implement ESA
measures in 2013.160  This is concerning in light of a recent study
estimating that about $1.3 million is required to “save” a single ver-
tebrate species.161  To illustrate, Hawaii received $350,000 from the
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service in 2011 to fund a single conservation
project—a half-mile long, predator-proof fence needed to protect
eleven endangered plant species.162  The Native Species Protection
Act would require states like Hawaii to choose between compromis-
ing their biodiversity or making dramatic fiscal changes, and unfor-
tunately, the former is more likely.
Federal grants to construct or implement conservation
projects, such as Hawaii’s fence, may not even be the most impor-
tant function of federal funding.  As Nicholas Primo writes, “states
remain almost totally dependent on the Federal Government for
155. See generally Camacho, supra note 56, at 10837-38 (concluding states not
currently equipped to take on endangered species conservation alone).
156. Id. at 10843 (discussing state expenditures to implement ESA).
157. Id. (discussing state expenditures to implement ESA).
158. Id. at 10842-43 (discussing source of state expenditures).
159. Senate Bill Would End Protection for Nearly 500 Species in Hawaii, supra note
109 (explaining potential impact of Native Species Protection Act on Hawaii).
160. Camacho, supra note 56 (surveying state expenditures to implement
ESA).
161. Dalia A. Conde et. al, Opportunities and Costs for Preventing Vertebrate Extinc-
tions, R220 (Mar. 2016), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960
982215000809 (estimating cumulative cost of saving a single endangered species).
162. Schuler, supra note 110 (reporting on federal environmental funding in
Hawaii).
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essential insights gained through research and development.”163
Effective and practical recovery plans are not dreamt up overnight.
These plans require a tremendous amount of resources and man-
power prior to implementation to ensure that they are pursued in
accordance with the latest scientific data and methods.164  Most
states are unfamiliar with creating comprehensive recovery plans
because they do not require them.165  Endangered species conser-
vation is an expensive endeavor from start to finish, which again
begs the question: why would any rational state want to turn down
federal aid, let alone supplant the ESA’s role? The only logical ex-
planation is that proponents of the Native Species Protection Act
intend to “lower the bar” substantially.166
D. A Proposal for Compromise Between the ESA and States
The Native Species Protection Act is not a viable solution, but
both sides—the Secretary of the Interior and the states—can and
should work together toward a reasonable compromise.  The fed-
eral agencies responsible for implementing the ESA must recognize
that the ESA is in unprecedented danger under the current admin-
istration.167  This is not the time for these agencies to stick to their
guns and dismiss the states’ concerns.  Today, states that oppose the
ESA have realistic bargaining power.168  The states—or some, at
least—want more control over their intrastate species and perhaps
the Secretary can entertain their requests within reasonable
parameters.169
The adversarial relationship between the states and federal
agencies must evolve.  For example, the Native Species Protection
Act, which if enacted, would overturn the Tenth Circuit’s decision
in PETPO, is seen by some as a reaction to the holding, given Utah
163. Primo, supra note 140 (citing Barry G. Rabe, Racing to the Top, the Bottom,
or the Middle of the Pack? The Evolving State Government Role in Environmental Protec-
tion, in NORMAN J. VIG & MICHAEL E. KRAFT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 33, 43 (Sage
Publications, 8th ed. 2013)) (explaining state dependence on federal funding).
164. Id. (explaining resources required to create and implement species re-
covery plan).
165. George, supra note 62, at 352 (noting that only five state endangered
species acts require a plan).
166. See Pittman, supra note 103 (reporting Utah Senators’ complaints about
federal regulation of species).
167. For a discussion on the rise in legislative attacks under current adminis-
tration, supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
168. For a discussion on the rise in legislative attacks under current adminis-
tration, see supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
169. See generally Lee, The Native Species Protection Act, supra note 12 (arguing
that local governments need more influential role).
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senators’ animosity toward the prairie dog.170  Litigation can lead to
a bitter loser and potentially irrational conduct.  Here, the irra-
tional reaction was an over-inclusive legislative solution to a narrow,
state-specific problem. Senator Lee’s comments on the Native Spe-
cies Protection Act make it clear that his conflict lies solely with the
regulation of a single species, the Utah Prairie Dog.171  Accordingly,
the Native Species Protection Act may have never come into being
if the state of Utah and U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service had been able
to reach a resolution on their own.
Utah’s Amicus Brief in the Tenth Circuit suggests that the con-
troversy originated with the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service’s 2012 revi-
sion to its Special Rule regulating the take of Utah Prairie Dogs.172
The Service’s original Special Rule, first promulgated in 1991, al-
lowed for the annual take of six thousand prairie dogs on both fed-
eral and private lands.173  However, the Service revised its Rule in
2012 to substantially limit its original provisions despite the species’
allegedly “robust population growth” during the prior ten years.174
The Service has defended its 2012 revision by arguing that the in-
creased restrictions are not as oppressive as Utah purports and that
“[w]hile Utah prairie dog populations have been stable to increas-
ing since annual population counts began in 1976, the species’ re-
covery will not be complete until it no longer meets the definition
of a threatened species.”175  In other words, the revision may not be
necessary for the species’ recovery but instead, necessary to speed-
up the species’ recovery plan.
Although the Service’s findings are entitled to the utmost def-
erence, perhaps its Special Rule revision here was unnecessary con-
170. See Senate Bill Aims to Strip Protections from Nearly 1,100 Endangered Species,
supra note 118 (stating that Native Species Protection Act seeks to overturn Tenth
Circuit’s decision in PETPO).
171. See Lee, The Native Species Protection Act, supra note 12 (discussing only
regulations directed at Utah Prairie Dogs).
172. See Brief of The State of Utah, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas,
Montana, South Dakota, and Wyoming as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee
and Affirmance at 3, People for Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., Nos. 14-4151, 14-4165 (10th Cir. Mar. 26, 2015), 2015 WL 3424895
(providing factual history); see also 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g) (revising Service’s Special
Rule).
173. Brief of the State of Utah et. al, supra note 172 (providing factual
history).
174. Id. at 4 (providing factual history).
175. Opening Brief for the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service et al. at 17, People for
Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 14-4151 (10th
Cir. Apr. 14, 2015), 2015 WL 1803483 (arguing in favor of Service’s decision to
revise Special Rule).
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sidering the mess it has caused.176  The Service should have
predicted that increasing restrictions for a successfully recovering
species that, unfortunately, is often at conflict with humans due to
its natural behavior, would open the ESA up to legal and political
attacks.177  This is not to suggest that the Service should refrain
from vigorously defending protected species, but perhaps it should
choose its battles more wisely given the ESA’s reputation.
The federal agencies must begin the process of mending their
relationship with the states.  The Secretary of the Interior should
work harder to instill a culture of federal and state cooperation.
The ESA does not currently allow states to contribute in any way to
federal protection planning.178  The states must deal with whatever
policies the federal agencies create for them and then may only
expand upon those federally-crafted policies.179  Under this current
system, it is easy to see why state officials like Mike Lee feel slighted
and complain that the ESA allows disconnected “[f]ederal bureau-
crats” to make local policy.180  Senator Mike Lee, specifically, may
operate under motives that are not quite that simple or innocent,
but this rationale is not unique to Lee, and ESA opponents will con-
tinue to employ it.  As previously discussed, state officials lack the
resources and capacity to take on a leadership role in endangered
species policy-making, but there would be no harm in giving states a
bigger role in the process.181
State representatives should be present during some of the
agencies’ meetings to offer input and voice their concerns.  Al-
though some would argue that this is an overly naive and optimistic
view, one cannot help but wonder whether the 2012 Special Rule
revision regarding Utah’s prairie dogs would have turned out differ-
176. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Endangered Species Act Special Rules: Questions
and Answers, https://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/factsheets/ESA%20Special
Rules%20Factsheet_020714.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2018) (explaining that 4(d)
rules can be used to resolve conflicts by conceding “de minimis” prohibitions).
177. Appellee’s Brief at 2, People for Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., (No. 14-4151) (10th Cir. May 18, 2015), 2015 WL
2395758 (arguing increased restrictions unnecessary because prairie dog popula-
tion has doubled twice since first listed).
178. Primo, supra note 140 (explaining lack of opportunity for state involve-
ment in federal planning).
179. Id. (explaining role of states in policymaking and implementation).
180. Lee, Utah Senators Introduce Native Species Protection Act, supra note 92
(complaining states lack opportunities for input).
181. See Revised Interagency Cooperative Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies in
ESA Activities, supra note 87 (directing Secretaries of Interior and Commerce to
cooperate to maximum extent practicable with states in carrying out ESA pro-
grams).  The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service encourages as much cooperation with
states as possible. Id.
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ently if Utah had been allowed to offer its input.  Again, although
these decisions should ultimately remain solely within the control
of the Service, it is possible that both sides could have reached rea-
sonable compromises without unreasonably risking the species’ re-
covery.  At minimum, these opportunities to participate in the
process would give states some sense of empowerment and involve-
ment, which the lack thereof seems to be a major source of
frustration.
Ironically, although the Service’s promulgation of a 4(d) spe-
cial rule may have acted as a catalyst in the Utah Prairie Dog
saga,182 such rules could serve as the platform for peace and collab-
oration between the states and the Service.  4(d) special rules, as
they are often referred to, “[allow] the Service the flexibility to cus-
tomize prohibitions and regulate activities to provide for the con-
servation of threatened species, potentially without involving all of
the restrictions that apply to endangered species.”183  The Service’s
2012 revision to the Utah Prairie Dog’s Special Rule suggests that it
was motivated, at least in part, by Forest Guardians’ 2003 petition—
and subsequent litigation—to reclassify the Utah Prairie Dog from
threatened to endangered.184  Regardless of how substantial it truly
was in propelling the revision, it can certainly give that impres-
sion.185  The average Utah farmer would not be wrong to complain
that conservation organizations like Forest Guardians have real in-
fluence on matters concerning his land, while he must settle for
submitting a post-hoc “written comment” upon the Service’s publi-
cation of a draft in the Federal Register.186  The Service grants the
state and its elected officials the same opportunity, and addresses
their comments in the rule’s final version, but it is unclear whether
every comment makes it to publication.187  The 4(d) special rule
procedure is overly unilateral and both “sides” deserve to be repre-
182. See Senate Bill Aims to Strip Protections from Nearly 1,100 Endangered Species,
supra note 170 (stating that Native Species Protection Act seeks to overturn Tenth
Circuit’s decision in PETPO).
183. See Endangered Species Act Special Rules: Questions and Answers, supra note
176 (explaining purpose and function of 4(d) special rules).
184. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revising the Special
Rule for the Utah Prairie Dog, 77 Fed. Reg. 46157 (Aug. 2, 2012) (codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17) (rationalizing Service’s revision).
185. See George, supra note 62, at 351-52 (discussing importance of private
enforcement provisions).  Private petitions and enforcement are, of course, among
the ESA’s most necessary and critical provisions. See id.
186. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revising the Spe-
cial Rule for the Utah Prairie Dog, 77 Fed. Reg. at 46162 (explaining procedure
for submitting public comment).
187. Id. (explaining procedure for submitting public comment).
25
Fors: The Native Species Protection Act: A Deceptively-Named Measure to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
202 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX: p. 177
sented at the rule’s inception.  From a purely political perspective,
without surrendering its ultimate authority, the Service can do
more to improve its relationship with the states in this context188
The Service must also focus on subsection 4(d)’s stated pur-
pose, specifically that its authority to promulgate these rules and
revise them exists to promote flexibility and customization of its
regulations.189  The Service should revise its 4(d) special rules more
often based on states’ concerns and available data.190  Even if these
revisions are never made, annual meetings with state officials and
periodical opportunities for public comment could promote a
greater sense of influence and collaboration.191  Many states and
their residents appear to want a fluid, evolving system for species
recovery that respects their concerns, which might begin by ensur-
ing that detrimental restrictions are discussed often and lifted as
soon as possible.  The Service would retain ultimate authority, of
course, to ensure that the species at issue is protected from jeop-
ardy.  An expedited system for upgrading species from threatened
to endangered status would also be needed in case the private ac-
tors go too far and reduce the population too quickly (in which
case full take prohibitions would return).192  This would not only
serve as a safety net, but also as an incentive to the private actors to
use restraint.
Although indulging the states to this degree may be criticized
as unfeasible given the Service’s already limited resources,193 recall
that not every state or community would require it.  Federal regula-
tion of intrastate species is not a source of controversy in every state
and there will be many senators voting against Mike Lee’s bill on
behalf of their states.  This proposed culture change should be ap-
plied holistically for the sake of the ESA in general, but states like
188. See Primo, supra note 140 (proposing ideas to improve hostile relation-
ship between states and federal agencies).
189. See Endangered Species Act Special Rules: Questions and Answers, supra note
183 (emphasis added) (explaining purpose and function of 4(d) special rules).
190. Nicky Ouellet, Western Govs Want Bigger State Role in Endangered Species
Management, MONTANA PUBLIC RADIO (June 28, 2017), http://mtpr.org/post/west-
ern-govs-want-bigger-state-role-endangered-species-management (discussing state
governors’ desire for more state input in listing decisions where models are
involved).
191. See Primo, supra note 140 (suggesting that more opportunities for state
comment and review would reduce opposition).
192. See Endangered Species Act Special Rules: Questions and Answers, supra note
176 (explaining lengthy due diligence that precedes proposed rule).
193. Defenders of Wildlife, Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Endan-
gered Species Act 4 (2013), https://defenders.org/sites/default/files/publications/
improving-the-effectiveness-and-efficiency-of-the-endangered-species-act.pdf (dis-
cussing Department of Interior’s historically limited budget authority).
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Utah merit unique attention.  As is the case with most problem chil-
dren, some extra love and care often goes a long way.
In some circumstances, states should also be given the oppor-
tunity to develop and propose their own primary regulations and
recovery plans.  For example, if Senator Mike Lee claims that Utah
state and local governments are better qualified to regulate the
Utah Prairie Dog, the Secretary of the Interior should put Lee to
the test.  The Secretary should allow Lee to develop and propose an
alternative to the controversial 2012 Special Rule.  This, of course,
would require recovery goals and strategies backed by scientific
data and a detailed plan that outlines how the state will fund its
management of the species.  If the state can research and construct
a satisfactory plan and the Secretary is willing to approve the plan
without any serious risk to the species at issue, then there is no rea-
son why that state should be denied the opportunity to pursue it.  If
the state cannot accomplish this, it will lose its ability to credibly
argue that it is better suited for the job. The Secretary and other
federal agencies will then have specific, tangible evidence that the
state is incapable of effectively taking sole responsibility for that in-
trastate species.  A realistic resolution may not be quite as simple as
this section of the paper suggests, but the overarching theme
stands: affected states need a more influential role in ESA policy-
making, which can be accomplished creatively, yet carefully, with-
out jeopardizing the ESA’s necessary authority.
IV. CONCLUSION
Only time will tell if the Native Species Protection Act will be-
come law, but anyone who values biodiversity should hope that it
does not. As experts and federal courts alike have urged, the au-
thority to regulate intrastate species is integral to the ESA’s overall
objective. The politicians and officials who advocate for the Native
Species Protection Act are either misinformed or insincere.  Either
position is dangerous in the current political landscape, where facts
are seemingly valued less than emotional appeal and ambitious
promises.  The ESA’s reputation makes it susceptible to radical and
ill-advised reform. However, the reality is that biodiversity protec-
tion requires immense responsibility and resources; and, for all of
its faults, the Federal Government remains the only entity that is
truly capable of preserving the natural world that we have
inherited.
In the future, perhaps in a world led by a generation with dif-
ferent values, endangered species protection can be a responsibility
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shared by everyone.  Today, however, the United States of America
is not ready for that kind of system and the authority to protect our
endangered species must be kept out of the hands of state and local
governments that are easily influenced by economic interests.
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